

**Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market: Comparative Policy Approaches (Western Europe)**

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## **1. Introduction**

This report examines the historical context of public policy and current policy developments concerning immigrants and ethnic minorities in west European labour markets. It provides information for the PIU ethnic minorities project about cross national differences in both the identification of policy issues and policy responses.

An underlying question is the extent to which 'multi-ethnic Britain' and its race relations policies are an exception in Europe. Can lessons be learnt from other European countries or are British policy responses distinct and exceptional? This report identifies some lessons that can be learnt from other European countries in terms of the understanding of policy issues and responses to these issues. At a basic level, no European country defines itself as a nation of immigrants. All have struggled to accommodate immigration-related diversity. There is evidence of lower levels of educational attainment and lower levels of labour market participation coupled with higher levels of unemployment. Responses have tended to focus on language training, education, employment, the building of social networks linked to the labour market, and anti-discrimination. These trends are, however, neither even between countries or between ethnic minority groups in those countries.

Differences arise from very diverse national social, political and economic contexts, which explain variations between countries in the understanding of policy issues and the response to them. The report pays particular attention to experiences in France, Germany and the Netherlands: which, respectively, are Europe's two largest immigration countries plus a country with some similarities with UK experiences. I also refer to developments in southern Europe (Italy and Spain, particularly). This provides a distinction between what can be called 'older' and 'newer' immigration countries as measured by experience of immigration. While information from newer immigration countries such as Spain and Italy does highlight the importance of labour market organisation and welfare state type, there are significant differences which suggest that few direct policy lessons can usefully be drawn for the UK. Similarities are stronger with 'older' immigration countries.

In addition to analysing national policies, I also specify the importance of (i) the multi-level nature of immigrant integration policies derived from the role played by sub-national (particularly the city) and supranational (growing EU role) influences; and (ii) a distinction between policies and non-policies in the sense that by some indicators countries such as the Netherlands with a high developed response to 'immigrant integration' issues could be seen to have fared less well in labour market and educational terms than Germany that does not have an 'immigrant integration' policy as such. This highlights the role of other social and labour market institutions, such as - in the German case - works' councils and the apprenticeship system. The weakening of these institutions can then contribute to the weakening of the labour market position of ethnic minorities and their descendants.

## **2. Background**

The analysis of 'national models' has become axiomatic to the study of immigrant integration. These national models provide frames that structure the normative and factual understanding of immigrant integration. These ways of thinking and acting also have important implications for the chances for the inclusion of immigrant newcomers in these countries.

A fixation with 'national models' can however be misleading. First, because other intervening variables at sub-national and supranational level need to be considered. Towns and cities across Europe are key locations, mainly because of the disproportionate concentration of

Europe's immigrant and ethnic minorities in urban areas (Garbaye, 2001). The EU's influence on labour market policy, social policy, migration policy and anti-discrimination policy is also increasing (Geddes, 2000). Second, because comparisons are often made between the labour markets and welfare states of developed west European countries. Given that these are also key arenas that mediate the inclusion/exclusion of immigrant newcomers, then in socio-economic terms, at least, there are reasons to suppose that comparative analysis can be fruitful (Bommes and Geddes, 2000). Third, although the effects are uneven, west European countries of immigration have experienced labour market and welfare state pressures arising from 'globalisation', neo-conservative welfare state ideologies, privatisation and European integration.

In this kind of multi-level context, race relations policy in a multi-ethnic Britain can be viewed as a distinct policy style, but not as exceptional. The UK faces similar policy dilemmas – educational attainment, employment, diversity between ethnic minority groups, a strong urban focus - as well as general labour market and welfare state developments. This is leaving aside the sometimes over-heated debates about national identity, culture and the identificational integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities. The UK also faces a growing influence from EU-developments that will, in some areas, bind the UK, while offering some potential for the diffusion of policy ideas and the development of good practice.

### **3. The concept of integration in comparative European perspective**

There is no clear definition of the concept of integration and the term is a 'treacherous metaphor' (Banton, 2001). Integration is, in fact, a default term because of the absence of a less controversial alternative. The result is that immigrant integration remains a reference point for policy responses that speak explicitly about 'integration' as a desirable end state. This is also the case in newer immigration countries too, see, for instance, the two volumes of reports published by the Italian *Commissione per le politiche di integrazione degli immigrati* (published as Zincone 2000, 2001).

Yet, in this area, 'non-policies' too can have effects. For instance, Germany has not had 'immigrant integration' policies. This does not mean that immigrants have not been included in the labour market and the welfare state, but that their inclusion occurred because of more general labour and social policies. Foreigners were turned into workers in Germany, but not into citizens.

There have also been policy shifts in those countries happier to talk about immigrant integration. In the Netherlands, for instance, multicultural policies have given way to policies focused far more explicitly on integration because multicultural policies were criticised for marginalising immigrants and their descendants. A recent paper on developments in the Netherlands by an influential commentator refers to the 'rise and fall of multiculturalism' (Entzinger, 2002).

Does this kind of development mark a 'return to assimilation' (Brubaker, 2001)? If in European countries immigrants and ethnic minorities are lagging behind the 'majority' population in their levels of educational attainment or in the labour market then does 'making them more similar' attain both practical and policy utility?. This does depend on disentangling the term from the cultural and identification baggage that has diminished its practical utility.

From a survey of existing European policy approaches, a distinction can be made between three types of integration.

**Socio-economic integration** refers to the utilisation of acquired rights in the education system and labour market. In this area, the emphasis in European countries has tended to be on:

- language training,
- education,
- employment and the development of social networks linked to the labour market
- anti-discrimination.

**Civil/political integration** refers to both citizenship as a formal status denoted by nationality laws and citizenship as a process of inclusion in the key institutions of modern society such as the welfare state and the political system. In the Netherlands, the *inburgering* policy (roughly translates as settling down policy) has introduced compulsory 600 hours courses for new immigrants with 500 hours of Dutch language training and 100 hours of civic education.

**Cultural integration** refers to processes of cognitive, cultural, behavioural and attitudinal change in people. This raises the obvious questions of 'from what?' 'to what?' and 'by whom?'. At the very least, we are discussing a shift from one form of heterogeneity to another with cultural requalification affecting both newcomers and members of the host society.

#### **4. National policies**

##### **4.1. The Netherlands**

Useful comparisons can be drawn with the Netherlands, although 'health warnings' are necessary:

- The Netherlands is a small, relatively cohesive society with a strong national identity. Moreover, the close relationship between government and academics in the Netherlands and the emphasis on consultation means that policy development in the Netherlands can sometimes seem like an experiment in social theory. This combines with an emphasis on consultation - including, for instance, the leaders of ethnic minority associations for policy measures that affect them - as distinct features of Dutch society and politics. Policy analysts can fly to the Netherlands, but policy ideas don't fly out quite so easily.
- The re-orientation in the 1990s of Dutch policy away from 'multiculturalism' towards 'integration' policies was an admission that the previous approach had failed. Whether the new approach associated as it is with changed welfare state ideologies and a communitarian emphasis on rights and responsibilities has improved the situation of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands remains an open question.

Around 17 per cent of the Dutch population were either not born in the Netherlands or have parents who were not born in the Netherlands. About 7 per cent of the population belongs to one of the target groups for Dutch immigrant integration policy, the largest groups being Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans/Arubans (Table 1). These target groups were originally established by the government in the Minority Paper (*Minderhedennota*) of 15 September 1983. The 1994 framework paper, Integration Policy on Ethnic Minorities (*Contourennota*), pointed out that some groups could no longer need to be considered as target groups because of their improved position. Since 1994, five target groups have been the main focus of policy in the areas of employment, education, housing: Surinamese, Antilleans/Arubans, Turks, Moroccans and refugees. In the 1990s the composition of the minority population changed because of increased numbers of refugees from Asian and African countries. By 2015 it is estimated that 40 per cent of the minority population will be found among the latter groups (Social and Cultural Planning Report, 1999)

Dutch integration policies took shape in the wake of the report produced in 1979 by the Scientific Council for Government Policy entitled 'Ethnic Minorities'. Prior to this point it had been assumed that the presence of immigrants was temporary. The 1979 Report was the basis

for Dutch minorities policy in the 1980s. Policy was formalised in the *Minderhedennota* (Minorities Act) of 1983. This defined the objective of Dutch minorities policy as 'Achieving a society in which all members of minority groups in the Netherlands, individually and also as groups, are in a situation of equality and have full opportunities for their development' or as it was more colloquially known, 'integration with retention of identity' (cited in Entzinger, 2002).

**Table 1: Dutch Population by ethnic origin, 1997 (in 1,000s)\***

Population group	Number
Native Dutch	12,890
Ethnic minorities, Of which:	
Main policy target groups**	1063
<b>Turks</b>	280
<b>Moroccans</b>	233
<b>Surinamese</b>	287
<b>Antilleans/Arubans</b>	95
Greeks	11
Italians	32
(former) Yugoslavians	60
Cape Verdians	17
Portuguese	13
Spaniards	29
Tunisians	6
Others	1,613
<b>Total population</b>	<b>15,567</b>

\* Ethnic origin: definition combining a person's birthplace and his or her parents' birthplaces; if one of the three birthplaces is outside the Netherlands, the person is considered to belong to an ethnic minority.

\*\* In addition, Moluccans, refugees (with legal status), caravan-dwellers and gypsies also belong to the target group of the integration policy for ethnic minorities.

Source: CBS (1998, p. 59).

Minorities policy had three main elements:

1. Emancipation in a multicultural society. The reference here was to a very distinct feature of Dutch social organisation: pillarisation. Without going into too much detail, the practical implications of this for the Dutch model of immigrant integration were twofold: efforts to preserve group identity coupled with emancipation (emphasising education as the vehicle for emancipation). Interestingly, these 'pillarised' kind of policy was introduced at a time when social changes meant that it was beginning to diminish in relevance for the traditional references (the catholic, protestant and secular 'pillars').

2. Equality before the law. Foreign residents such as those who arrived as 'guestworkers' were not expected to take up Dutch citizenship. Instead, measures emphasised equal access for citizens and non-citizens alike to the labour market and the welfare state with strengthened anti-discrimination legislation. From 1992, dual nationality was also permitted, which led to an increase in naturalisations, but the possibilities for dual citizenship were reduced in 1997.

3. Promoting equal opportunity. This rested on the idea of 'proportionality', i.e., that immigrants should participate in housing, education and employment systems in proportion to their numerical size. It was here that some of the main deficiencies were noted with poorer levels of educational attainment, residential segregation, and higher levels of unemployment among targeted ethnic minority groups.

By the late 1980s there was concern that the minorities policy was actually contributing to the marginalisation of ethnic minorities as a result of policies that emphasised cultural affirmation rather than participation in Dutch society. There were other important changes. The ethnic minority population had both doubled in size and become more complex in composition both in terms of the number of groups and diversity within groups.

In 1989 the Scientific Council for Government Policy produced a report entitled *Immigrant Policy*, which argued that previous policy has placed too much emphasis on multiculturalism and not enough on integration. This coincided with more general concerns about the effects of labour market restructuring and welfare state reform on excluded ethnic minorities. The report recommended more emphasis on education, employment policy and language training. Culture was increasingly defined as a private matter with mother tongue teaching placed outside of the core curriculum in schools.

In May 1994 the new Labour Party-led coalition introduced the *Contourennota integratiebelied etnische minderheden* (Framework Paper on Integration Policy and Ethnic Minorities). Minorities policy was relabelled as integration policy. The emphasis passed from group identities to independence and self-reliance. These shifts also reflect the rise of neo-conservative welfare state ideologies. In practical terms the integration policy introduced in the Netherlands meant placing far more emphasis on participation in the education system and the labour market. Clearly there were some political sensitivities that needed to be dealt with or skirted around. This meant that the language used in the report and the legislation did not seem to differ too strongly from what had gone before. Integration was defined as 'a process leading to the full and equal participation of individuals and groups in society, for which mutual respect for identity is seen as a necessary condition' (cited in Entzinger, 2002). In substantive terms, however, there was a significant break with past policy. The emphasis of policy would henceforth be placed on socio-economic integration with the idea that immigrant newcomers had a responsibility to adapt to Dutch society.

This shift in the approach to immigrant integration in the Netherlands was also linked to general social policy concerns relating to all people in disadvantaged situations. For instance, research on educational attainment of children from various groups of immigrants in the Netherlands asked whether class, family or migrant culture were the most significant explanations for lower educational attainment. It was found that the lower class position of immigrants was the most important explanation for lower educational attainment. Moreover, when parental class and pedagogical attitudes and behaviour were controlled for, children belonging to some immigrant groups had higher levels of educational attainment than comparable Dutch children (van t'Hof and Dronkers, 1994). This emphasis on more general social policy concerns was also evident in the renaming of educational programmes for immigrant children as 'educational priority programmes' which were opened to immigrants and non-immigrants alike. The term 'mainstreaming' was also used to describe these kinds of process.

This marked a shift from an emphasis on groups to an emphasis on individuals with more reference made to 'immigrants' rather than to 'ethnic minorities'. This allows some of the problems caused by the proliferation and diversity of ethnic minority groups to be avoided, but does produce a rather confusing side-effect in that the success of policies targeted at individual immigrants can only be measured at the group level.

Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence of factors that influenced this change in thinking. Tables 2 and 3 show that although employment among ethnic minorities increased more rapidly than for native Dutch people, unemployment rates for ethnic minorities were still considerably higher. Similarly, labour market participation increased more rapidly, but only 28 per cent of ethnic minorities were working compared to 43 per cent of native Dutch.

**Table 2: Labour market position in the Netherlands by nationality/birthplace, 1997**

	Native Dutch	(All) Ethnic minorities	Only policy target-group minorities
Population (in 1,000s)	9,433	1,130	564
Participation rate (%)*	66	57	54
Employment rate (%)**	62	48	45
(Registered) Unemployment rate (%)	4	16	20

\* Labour force as % of population in respective age group.

\*\* Employed as % of population in respective age group.

Source: CBS (1998, p. 68); data from Labour Force Survey.

Unemployment among ethnic minority youth remains very high. In 1998, in the age group 15-24 the figure for male Antillean youth was 16 per cent, for Turkish youth 23 per cent, for Moroccans 30 per cent and for Surinamese 28 per cent.

**Table 3: Labour force in the Netherlands by education, gender and nationality/birthplace, 1997 (in %)**

	Dutch	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans/ Arubans	Others
<b>Males</b>						
Primary	8	46	50	19	0	24
Vocational	22	26	22	32	27	29
Secondary	45	21	22	35	33	32
Higher	25	7	6	14	27	15
Total absolute values	3,718,000	46,000	36,000	63,000	15,000	34,000
Employment rate	75	46	42	60	59	52
<b>Females</b>						
Primary	6	44	36	17	0	25
Vocational	21	22	27	26	25	20
Secondary	47	28	27	40	42	35
Higher	26	0	0	17	17	20
Total absolute values	2,362,000	18,000	11,000	53,000	12,000	20,000
Employment rate	46	18	15	47	37	38

Source: CBS (1998).

Four explanations can be advanced for the disadvantaged position of ethnic minorities in the Dutch labour market which in turn prompted a reflection of minorities policy:

- Low educational levels among target ethnic minority groups. Research work by Veenman (1997, 1998) explicitly links social capital and social mobility to the persistence of racial discrimination for Dutch ethnic minorities in education and the labour market. It argues for a pro-active national cultural education for immigrants and minorities that will enable them to

overcome barriers and prejudice, and against the multicultural approach of the minorities policy.

- Insufficient knowledge of the Dutch language to function effectively in the labour market and in Dutch society more generally.
- The lack of social networks linking ethnic minorities to the labour market
- Direct and indirect discrimination in recruitment and selection. Pettigrew (1998) argued that, while explicit discrimination was rare in the Netherlands, more implicit forms of integration against immigrants were powerful factors in recruitment processes.

A stronger emphasis on integration was evident in the appointment in 1997 of Roger Van Boxtel as the first minister for Urban and Integration Policy. Van Boxtel was far more willing to emphasise an obligation to adapt to Dutch society, but was also the first government minister to state openly that the Netherlands was an immigration country. Van Boxtel's 1998 report entitled 'Providing opportunities, seizing opportunities' stated that: 'Members of ethnic minorities can be expected to do their utmost in order to acquire an independent position in our country as soon as possible. This requires them to choose for this society and to take responsibility for making use of the many facilities that our country offers to its new compatriots. Mastering the Dutch language is a crucial aspect of this'.

The report identified four policy priorities:

- Youth, including education and delinquency
- Combating unemployment
- Anti-discrimination. The Equal Treatment Commission was established in 1994 to review complaints and to monitor implementation of the regulations on equal treatment. It deals with complaints about direct and indirect discrimination in nine areas (figures in brackets refer to the number of requests for decisions made in 1998): religion (18), personal convictions and views (1), political beliefs (1), race/nationality (104), gender (118), sexual preference (22), marital status (35), duration of employment (27), no grounds given 20 for a total of 346 requests (Equal Opportunities Commission, 1998 Annual Report). The weakness of Dutch anti-discrimination legislation has been identified by Pettigrew who points to the absence of US style 'class actions' (Pettigrew, 1998).
- Communication between 'partners in integration'. Corporatist policies in the Netherlands mean that immigrant associations are consulted by government on policies that affect them. How representative these associations are is another question, but their existence at least meets the need to consult.

A parallel development was the emphasis on *inburgering*, roughly translated as 'settling down' policy. This involved, first, proposals for special trainee positions for new immigrants that would allow them to achieve workplace experience without receiving full pay. Second, encouragement for business start-ups. Between 1986 and 1997 the number of entrepreneurs or self-employed people among ethnic minorities more than doubled, while the rate of increase for native Dutch was only by a factor of 1.5. Third, language training for new immigrants. This third measure provoked most political debate. Not least, because this kind of assimilatory measure would have not happened under the previous minorities policy where mother tongue teaching was part of the core curriculum in schools. Legislation in 1997 (Law on the Civic Integration of Newcomers) required new immigrants to attend a 600 hour training course, 500 hours of which are devoted to language skills and 100 hours to civic education. Courses are free. In 1999, 17,000 immigrants registered at a cost to the Dutch government of 138 million Euros. Finland and Denmark have borrowed the idea of mandatory civic integration courses. As one of the

instigators of the policy put it, this kind of approach has an ambition 'almost unthinkable under minorities policy' (Entzinger, 2002).

At this stage, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of policy because it was only properly introduced in 1999. Evaluation studies of pilot projects suggested that the link with the labour market was not as strong as intended. This is explained by the complex decentralised structure for dividing funds for increasing the employability of social security beneficiaries with much depending on decisions taken by individual regional employment services and municipalities.

A number of complementary social policy measures can also be identified that, although not targeted specifically at ethnic minorities, do affect people from ethnic minorities who tend to be disproportionately represented among the targets of such measures:

- Existing instruments for subsidised employment were expanded and combined in the *Wet inschakeling werkzoekenden* (WIW) (Law on the integration of jobseekers), which came into effect on 1 January 1998. This law aims to provide municipalities with more possibilities to guide unemployed persons under the age of 23 years and the long-term unemployed (>1 year) into the labour market. The WIW enables municipalities to apply the available funds more effectively and to offer made-to-measure work. The WIW includes the former Youth Employment Guarantee Act (JWG), Labour Pools (*Banenpools*), activation instruments for the young, employment without losing benefits (Article 144 of the ABW, the National Assistance Act) and subsidies for Experiments with the Activation of Benefit Money (*Subsidieregeling experimenten activering van uitkeringsgelden* - EAU). The recent introduction of this legislation means that no data are available on the participation of ethnic minorities in the WIW.
- The Youth Employment Guarantee Act (JWG) guarantees young unemployed a job offer, training offer or a preparatory phase. Evaluations suggest that young members of ethnic minority groups were less likely to be working and more likely to be fired if they did find work (Minorities Report, 1998). On the other hand, studies of the Youth Employment Guarantee Act (JWG) and the Labour Pools (*Banenpools*) indicate that over time measures succeed better in reaching their target groups. For the JWG it is also known from the evaluation that the net effect of the measure, that is, the difference made by the measure itself, was higher for people with a low level of education and for those from ethnic minorities. In other words, so-called deadweight effects - unemployed being hired who would also have been hired without the measure - were lower for these groups. This suggests the importance of 'extreme targeting' in order for ethnic minorities to benefit proportionally from employment measures. So far no specific targets have been set, however, for the participation of ethnic minorities - or others for that matter.
- Specific projects for ethnic minorities have been defined under some of the regulations, notably the EAU (Experiments with the Activations of Benefits Money) and the JWG. Evaluations of the EAU showed that on 30 June 1997, the participation of ethnic minorities in this programme was considerably higher than in the Labour Pools, the JWG and the population of unemployment assistance beneficiaries at the end of 1995 (Social and Cultural report, 1999, p. 24). It appears that labour market measures are more successful in reaching ethnic minorities when specifically designed to do so.
- There are also specific projects for young people from ethnic minority groups aiming to give them better access to regular employment measures. In 1998, seven already existing projects for Antilleans and Arubans had their duration extended to 1999, and another 31 municipalities received money for projects that will run until 1 May 2001, including 20 projects for Moroccan and Turkish youth.

- The *Extra werkgelegenheid voor langdurig werklozen* (additional employment for long-term unemployed) provides subsidised employment at wages between 100% and 120% of the statutory minimum wage (130% as of 1 January 1999). A substantial number of the jobs were allocated to the four large cities in which most of the ethnic minority populations live. In 1997, 47% of the inflow into this measure in the four large cities consisted of ethnic minorities. In 15 other larger cities, this share amounted to 18%. In the remaining 60 municipalities, 23% of the inflow was non-native Dutch. On average for all 79 municipalities, 34% of the inflow came from ethnic minorities (Minorities Report, 1999, p. 27).

In addition to these initiatives, three groups of institutions have particular relevance to the labour market position of ethnic minorities:


- The Public Employment Service (*Arbeidsvoorziening*) aims for proportional placement of ethnic minorities in so-called "labour market trajectories" (*trajecten*). Although the number of placements in such trajectories has increased somewhat, the placement rate for unemployed jobseekers from ethnic minorities is still lower than that for their native Dutch counterparts (Minorities Report, 1999: p. 31). In 1997, the employment service published a plan of action for increasing their services for ethnic minorities. No later than 1 January 2000, ethnic minorities shall be proportionally represented in all employment service activities. The Employment Service will actively involve itself in the implementation of the SAMEN Law and the provisions on ethnic minorities in collective agreements (see below). Recruitment has been identified as an area where levels of discrimination are quite high (Pettigrew, 1998; Bovenkerk, Gras and Ramsodh, 1995). In July 1994 a law was introduced based on the Canadian Employment Equity Act. This law on Enhancement of Equal Labour Participation of Allochtones (WBEEA) obliged firms employing 35 workers or more to recruit a proportion of immigrant workers equal to the proportion of immigrants living in the region where the firm is established. There was strong resistance from employers to these measures that were seen as interfering in recruitment processes. In 1996, it was found that only 14% of employers were complying fully with its stipulations. Almost 60% of the employers had introduced the compulsory registration of the ethnic origin of employees. Companies complained about the complexity and volume of procedures and administrative requirements (Minorities Report, 1998, p. 30). This illustrates the difficulty of making political interventions into those kinds of areas where the presence or absence of social networks is a crucial factor. Organisations can claim to offer fair recruitment processes, but a study by the magazine *Intermediair* in 1995 found that a third of ethnic minority job applicants were discriminated against. The WBEEA law was replaced by the Law on the Promotion of Labour Market Participation of Minorities (Wet SAMEN), which came into force in 1998. The administrative obligations were simplified and the compulsory auditor's statement abolished. Non-compliance with the law was no longer a criminal offence. Instead, the Labour Inspectorate was given a supervisory task and works councils were given more authority.
- Entrepreneurialism. The Ministry of Economic Affairs seeks to promote entrepreneurship and increase the opportunities for start-ups and firm growth. Two measures were launched to assist potential entrepreneurs from ethnic minority groups:
  - MOTOR (Dutch abbreviation for Migrant Entrepreneur: Talent, Education, Result), which aims to improve entrepreneurship amongst migrants. Pilot projects are initiated at the local level, in which improvements and modifications are introduced to the existing infrastructure for guidance to and advice for starters. Institutions dealing with migrant issues, advice for starters and business education work together in the organisation of these projects. The project started on June 1 1997 will last 2.5 years

and receives a subsidy from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. It started on 1 June 1997.

- Franchising amongst migrants: franchise suppliers and entrepreneurs from minority groups are brought together under this project. This should provide a solution to two problems that entrepreneurs from these groups face: lack of management skills and unfavourable locations for their businesses.
- Social partners. The Dutch social partners concluded an agreement on ethnic minorities in the Labour Foundation entitled *Met minderheden meer mogelijkheden* (More Possibilities with Minorities, 1997-2000). The social partners at the central level agreed to advise the collective bargaining partners at sectoral level on certain initiatives and to advise individual companies on the establishment of their own target figures from these. The framework agreement also contains several recommendations with regard to the implementation of agreements, including the delegation of the actual work to separate organisations. This question of implementation arose from a report on the previous minorities agreement (1990-1996) on the basis of research in 13 sectors.

The Institute for Sociological-Economic Research at the University of Rotterdam produces an 'Integration Monitor' on behalf of the Social and Cultural Planning Office (which itself produces an annual 'Minorities Report'). This was based on a request by the Minister for Urban Policy and Integration of Ethnic Minorities for an information system that would allow the evaluation of policy impact. The structure of the integration monitor is shown in Diagram 1.

**Diagram 1: The Dimensions of Integration in the Dutch Integration Monitor.**



Source: Dutch Integration Monitor, abridgement (2000: 8)

In addition to these factors, Dutch developments also highlight the importance of the role of big cities because these are the areas – as in the UK – where ethnic minorities disproportionately

tend to reside. Measures have been developed to increase the number of workers from ethnic minorities in public services and the health-care sector. Other initiatives seek to improve the educational level of ethnic minorities. In addition, ethnic minorities may benefit from other general policies, notably, the Dutch "large-city policy" (*grote-stedenbeleid*).

In short, the emphasis on socio-economic integration in the Netherlands was a response to multicultural policies that were seen as based on static conceptions of culture and which marginalised ethnic minorities. Policy changes also reflected changed welfare state ideologies and ideas about entitlement to welfare state benefits coupled with communitarian thinking that stresses integration as a two-sided process of adjustment but with a clear onus on immigrants to adapt. In the next section, I move on to consider the case of Germany, which, because of the 'not an immigration country' mantra and ethno-cultural understanding of nationality and citizenship has been portrayed as more exclusive than the Netherlands. In fact, there is some research evidence to suggest that 'exclusive' Germany has had more success in the socio-economic integration of 'foreigners' (the term used in Germany) than the Netherlands (Thranhardt, 2000). This has been linked to the role of social and labour market institutions, investment in human capital through the apprenticeship system, and the development of networks that facilitated some labour market inclusion although in specific segments of the labour market and with lower levels of social mobility. That said, while formulating its immigration policy (Germany's first) the SPD/Green coalition government has also looked to the Netherlands, as shown by the emphasis on language training.

#### 4.2 Germany

In comparison with the Netherlands there is a basic problem with analysing German immigrant integration policies. This is that Germany does not have official immigrant integration policies. That said, German non-policy has produced interesting effects that highlight the role of social capital and social networks related to labour market inclusion. In analytical terms, another basic problem is that Germany does not systematically monitor integration policies because it can't monitor something that doesn't exist. This means that the available data is not as extensive as it is for the Netherlands (although in no other European countries is data so readily available as it is in the Netherlands).

**Table 4: Foreign Residents in Germany (as of March 1998)**

Nationality	31.12.'95	31.12.'97	31.12.'98
Turkey	2.014.311	2.107.426	2.110.223
Ex-Yugoslavia	797.754	721.029	719.474
Italy	586.089	607.868	612.048
Greece	359.556	363.202	363.514
Bosnia-Herzegovina	316.024	281.380	190.119
Croatia	185.122	206.554	208.909
Spain	132.283	131.636	131.121
Portugal	125.131	132.314	132.578
Morocco	81.922	83.904	82.748
Tunisia	26.396	25.394	*25.000
Macedonia	26.396	42.550	46.167
Slovenia	17.328	18.093	18.412
Anwerbestaaten insgesamt	4.668.312	4.721.350	4.640.313
Ausländer insgesamt	7.173.866	7.365.833	7.319.593

Source: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung

In the absence of official government policies, a key role was played by charitable organisations. The Catholic organisation Caritas looked after Catholics from Italy, Portugal and Spain, the protestant *Diakonie* got non-Catholic Christians from Greece while the non-denominational *Arbeitswohlfahrt* with trade union links assumed responsibility for Turks and Maghrebis. The result was the creation of cultures based on religious identities that many of the immigrants had not chosen for themselves. Migrants were turned whether they liked it or not into representatives of their national culture.

The defining characteristic of the Federal Republic of Germany as a *sozialstaat* points to the key role of labour market and welfare state institutions in the socio-economic integration of foreign workers, even though this was not an official government policy. It could be said that the integration of foreign workers into the German labour market and welfare state occurred despite rather than because of government policies. In comparison with the Netherlands it has been argued that the Dutch re-affirmed the principles of pillarisation - leading to the affirmation of group identities and social distance – at a time when these were becoming less relevant for other members of Dutch society (Bommes, n.d.). Table 5 compares unemployment between immigrants and the indigenous population in Germany and the Netherlands.

**Table 5: Comparing unemployment in the indigenous and immigrant populations of West Germany and the Netherlands**

Year	West Germany				Netherlands			
	Indigenous		Foreigners		Indigenous		Foreigners	
	All	<25	All	<25	All	<25	All	<25
1983	6.0	10.1	11.3	18.2	11.3	20.4	24.5	37.2
1984	6.3	9.8	11.3	17.1	-	-	-	-
1985	6.4	9.3	12.0	17.4	9.8	16.9	27.1	37.6
1986	6.1	7.3	12.0	14.8	-	-	-	-
1987	5.9	6.4	10.9	12.7	8.8	13.6	25.9	31.7
1988	5.9	6.4	10.9	12.7	8.8	13.6	25.9	31.7
1989	5.4	5.2	9.3	9.9	8.0	12.3	26.6	37.0
1990	4.5	4.3	8.7	7.5	7.0	10.2	24.7	31.6
1991	5.1	5.2	8.4	8.5	6.6	10.2	25.2	34.9
1992	6.1	5.5	9.2	10.4	5.1	7.7	16.5	16.0
1993	7.1	6.8	13.3	14.3	5.7	9.7	19.6	25.5
1994	8.1	7.7	15.5	17.1	6.5	10.7	22.5	25.9
1995	7.5	7.3	15.0	15.7	6.5	11.5	23.5	26.9

Source: Thränhardt (2000 p.175 )

It has been argued on the basis of this data that the integration of immigrants has occurred at a level similar to the German working class (Thränhardt, 2000). There are, however, much higher and accelerating levels of unemployment among Turks that are comparable to figures in the Netherlands.

**Table 6: Unemployment Rates for Foreign born workers in Germany 1980-2000(%)**

	1980	1985	1990	1995	1998	2000
Greece	3,8	11,5	10	15,7	18,2	16,1
Italy	4,8	14,3	11	15,9	18	15,2
Portugal	2	7,4	5,8	11,9	13	11,5
Spain	3	8,8	7,2	10,7	12,6	11,7
Yugoslavia	2,6	10	6,3	9,2	11,6	11,2
Turkey	5,9	14,6	10,3	18,9	23,2	21,2

Source: Gutachten Seifert, S. 14.

There is also evidence of discrimination in the Dutch labour market. Comparative research for the International Labour Organisation showed that when persons with the same qualifications but from different ethnic groups applied for a job then 'discrimination was 'proven to exist' and that 'the possibility of actually getting a job was almost zero for the Moroccan applicant (Bovenkerk, Gras and Ramssoedh, 1995: 21, 52). The analysis of Germany showed discrimination in the banking and insurance sector and among small firms, but discrimination was not as widespread as in the Netherlands (Goldberg, Mourinho and Kulke, 1996).

Two explanations have been offered for this. The first focuses on social processes in the Netherlands and the second on the role played by German labour market institutions, particularly works councils and the apprenticeship system.

In terms of Dutch social processes, it has been argued that 'minorisation' occurred in the Netherlands (Rath, 1993). By this was meant that the difference between minorities and the majority in every aspect of life were stressed. This perpetuated the declining system of pillarisation, but for immigrants only. This was likely to maintain social distance between immigrants and Dutch society and thwart the development of social capital and social networks. If ethnic minorities are separate then they cannot become part of the Dutch national 'imagined community' and thus will be tolerated, but will not be accepted as equal participants in Dutch society.

Second, the role of labour market institutions in Germany. The *Betriebsrat* (works councils) have led to foreigners been included in Germany as workers even if not as citizens. It's well known that foreigners in Germany were excluded from nationality and thus from participation in the formal political process. They were, however, entitled to participate in works councils. Foreign workers have full voting rights and eligibility to stand. There has been a steady increase in the numbers of foreign workers on these *Betriebsrat* and these give foreign workers real influence over work time, dismissals and a wide range of other measures. As Thränhardt (2000: 179) puts it: 'participation makes sense for both foreign and indigenous workers, and co-operation strengthens the worker's position'. The apprenticeship system as a form of human capital investment in the highly differentiated German education system has been more and more opened to immigrant youth. This system is difficult to imitate in countries with more flexible labour markets. Research among German human resource managers suggested that the provision of such training – even in the face of worker turnover – was a social expectation based on the norm that it is the responsibility of companies to offer this kind of training even when it would be cheaper to hire workers trained at the expense of other companies. Where unions are weaker, wages relatively flexible and the costs of firing relatively low then these conditions are less likely to apply. Indeed, the German system has been suggested as a model for Dutch development (Central Planning Bureau, 1995).

The most significant recent developments concern the German government's proposals to introduce immigration and immigrant integration policies for the first time. On July 4, 2001, a 21-member Immigration Commission issued its final report, "Organising Immigration - Fostering Integration", (The Sussmueth Report after its Chairwoman). The report was motivated by concerns about the impacts of demographic changes on the German labour market. It was argued that Germany needed immigrant workers and that if Germany was to be competitive on the international market for immigrant workers then it needed to offer an attractive integration package (available at: [http://www.bmi.bund.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix\\_46876.htm](http://www.bmi.bund.de/dokumente/Artikel/ix_46876.htm))

An influential precursor of this policy was the 'Green Card' scheme which entered into effect in August 2000. This sought to tackle labour market gaps in the IT sector by offering green cards to foreign professionals coming to fill IT jobs. By July 2001, about 8,000 foreign IT professionals were admitted under the program, which grants two-year work permits renewable for up to five years. The three leading countries of origin were India, Russia and Romania. The target was set to produce an additional 250,000 specialists for the information technology sector by the year 2005. Training measures have also been initiated, but short-term needs require the government to open up new regulatory avenues. Working and salary conditions for these foreign specialists are the same as for domestic employees.

The commission on immigration emphasised the need to successfully integrate immigrants. The Commission looked across the border to the Netherlands to argue that foreigners should learn German. This then leads to debate about the proper mix of carrots and sticks to encourage immigrants to learn German. This has included some talk of "integration contracts" which would offer a quicker path to an unlimited residence or work permit for foreigners who pass a German language test, and penalties such as delayed family unification if immigrants do not learn German. The Commission also proposed that more German language courses be offered to resident foreigners, with funding doubled to DM615 million annually to teach 220,000 foreigners a year.

On August 3, 2001, the Interior Minister Otto Schilly proposed a bill that would give Germany its first-ever regulated immigration system ([www.bmi.bund.de](http://www.bmi.bund.de)). Schilly made the symbolically important declaration that "Germany is an immigration country". He also linked German labour market needs to a developing global competition for high-skilled immigrants: 'There's competition among the industrialised countries for the best minds. That's why we have to direct our immigration law more strongly toward our own economic interests'. The proposal made by Schilly's would convert the present Federal Office for the Recognition of Refugees into a Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Schilly was unprepared to follow all the advice of the immigration commission. He ruled out specific immigration quotas.

#### 4.3 France

In the way that these debates are usually framed, French 'national integration' with its assimilatory emphasis is counterposed rather than compared with that of the UK. The two approaches appear mutually antagonistic, although perhaps the actual distance between the two approaches is not as great as some of the rhetoric associated with them would suggest (Favell, 1998). According to the 1999 census 5.6 per cent of the French population are non-French nationals (Table 8).

**Table 7: Total French Population by Nationality 1982-1999**

	1982	1990	1999
Total population	54 295 612	56 651 955	58 520 688
<u>French by birth</u>	49 159 844	51 275 074	52 902 209
Acquired French nationality	1 421 568	1 780 279	2 355 293
Foreigners	3 714 200	3 596 602	3 263 186
	6,8 %	6,3 %	5,6 %
Spanish	327 156	216 047	161 762
Italian	340 308	252 759	201 670
Portuguese	767 304	649 714	553 663
Algerian	805 116	614 207	477 482
Moroccan	441 308	572 652	504 096
Tunisian	190 800	206 336	154 356
Others	842 208	1 084 887	1 210 157

Source : INSEE

There is a striking similarity between France and Germany is that in both countries 'immigrant integration' has been the policy that dare not speak its name. This does not mean that immigrant integration policies don't occur, but that they aren't called 'immigrant integration' and are not targeted at 'ethnic minorities', which from French republican reasoning has been seen as a soft form of apartheid. The reason for this is the strongly ingrained notion that immigrants are waiting in the antechamber of national citizenship before being transformed from foreigners into French people by French republican institutions. The fact that practical-on-the-ground realities have changed considerably over recent years has not diminished the discursive power of this construction. The practical effect of this is that if policies are to be found that target French immigrants then they are more likely to be housed under the label *politique de la ville* (urban policy) and are decentralised. In a sense, therefore, the local level is where social relations associated with immigrant integration become real and where the interface between immigrants and French institutions is most clear.

In France too there have been recent changes. Not least, some openness to ideas about anti-discrimination that reflect both domestic political developments with a strong local and decentralised emphasis coupled with some response to EU developments based on Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty. This could be construed as an embrace of British ideas about ethnic minorities and anti-discrimination, but this would be over-stating the case. The developments can better be seen as a result of the Socialist government trying to re-connect with a left-wing constituency where concern about racism and discrimination has been evident and to activate a discourse about active citizenship as a vehicle for the inclusion of immigrants into French society. In such terms, both the terms of the debate and the organisation of the response remain distinctly French.

Because of the ways in which debates are framed, problems are encountered when analysing immigrant integration into the French labour market because France has not tended to systematically analyse its immigrant and immigrant-origin population in the kinds of ways that would be familiar to students of the UK and the Netherlands. One exception to this was the report by Tribalat (1995) which was controversial because it asked questions about ethnic

origin and language that had not been asked before. It had previously been assumed that immigrant-origin people became invisible as a result of the working of the French melting pot (*le cruuset français*). Tribalat's study focused on adults born in Algeria, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and in certain African and South Asian countries and interviews with people born in France (mostly with people between the ages of 20-29) where the head of household was not born in France. The data derived from the interviews was then compared with a control group of the indigenous population. The Tribalat report uses the word assimilation and echoes American debates that emphasise some kind of return to assimilation in relation to immigration from Asian and Latin American countries, with more explicit focus on language and education (parallels with the Netherlands and Germany are clear).

Tables 7, 8 and 9 present some data on France that confirms more general trends evident across Europe. First, they show lower levels of educational attainment and higher levels of unemployment, but also indicate that there are elements of diversity within the broadly-defined French immigrant population. For instance, Maghrebi youth have been a particular concern of social policy-makers. A key factor in this respect has been Islam. There were some attempts in the early 1990s to institutionalise a French form of Islam. At the moment, most Imams are trained in Algeria. This has been seen as a problem. Nearly 10 years ago, the Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua spoke of the need for a 'French Islam'. These ideas were recently resuscitated by President Chirac when meeting with newly elected Mayors.

**Table 8: Elementary schooling of pupils entering secondary education in France**

	Immigrant pupils		Pupils born in France	
		Total	Children of working class people	
At least three years of nursery school	35	77	75	
Have not repeated a class in primary school	48	75	64	
Have repeated one level at primary school more than once	15	7	12	
<b>Results in national tests for entry into secondary education</b>				
Average in French language	62.3	71.9	67.7	
Of which: Boys	58.8	70.2	66.1	
Girls	65.6	73.6	69.4	
Average in mathematics	71.6	78.8	75.7	
Of which: Boys	71.2	78.6	75.6	
Girls	72.0	79.0	75.8	

Source: Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la recherche, Dep, panel national 1989 d'élèves du second degré

**Table 9: Language ability of immigrants in France (1992)**

Languages spoken to their children by immigrants arriving under the age of 15.

Origin	Mother tongue only	French only
Black African countries	19	54
Spain	18	37
Algeria	19	35
Morocco	26	28
Portugal	17	26
South East Asia	18	23
Turkey	56	7

Source: Tribalat (1995)

**Table 10: Unemployment levels by sex and age in 1990 and 1995 in France**

	1990			1995		
	Total population	active	Active immigrant population	Total population	active	Active immigrant population
Men	7.0		13.7	9.8		18.8
15-24	15.3		30.5	21.0		37.2
25-39	6.7		13.6	9.7		19.8
40-49	4.6		11.3	7.8		17.2
>50	5.4		11.7	7.3		15.6
Women	12.0		22.7	13.9		21.8
15-24	23.9		30.5	32.2		39.0
25-39	12.2		25.6	14.8		25.9
40-49	8.5		17.8	10.0		17.4
>50	8.0		16.6	8.2		12.4
Total	8.9		16.6	11.6		19.9

Source: INSEE

**Table 11: Unemployment levels of immigrants by country of origin in France (1995)**

Country of origin	Men	Women
EU	8.8	10.7
Of which: Spain	13.2	11.3
Italy	11.9	11.2
Portugal	7.1	8.9
Algeria	26.5	36.0
Morocco	28.7	43.3
Tunisia	28.1	38.5
Black Africa	26.2	31.2
Turkey	29.3	44.7
South East Asia	17.4	25.1
Other countries	16.8	20.1
Total	18.8	21.8

Source: INSEE

The main actors in the area of integration are the associations, either financed through a national agency with regional offices (the Fonds d'Actions Sociales) or through municipalities. The general evolution has not been to target 'immigrants' per se so much as neighbourhoods as part of the *politique de la ville*. That said, the contracts signed between the central state and the local authorities mention the immigrant population and integration issues. The measures that have been adopted tend to be focused on this local level with, for instance, tax free zones in deprived areas to encourage business start-ups and the targeting of money in what are called Education Priority Zones. There can be markedly different responses in a relatively small geographical area as Garbaye's (2001) study of Lille and Roubaix demonstrates.

The Socialist government elected in 1998 has also shown more concern about tackling racist discrimination. In October 1998 a circular when from the Ministry of Employment and Solidarity to the Préfets, to the Director of the ANPE (the national agency for employment), and to the Director of AFPA (national agency for professional training). This circular stated the fight

against racial discrimination was to be regarded as an important government priority with two main objectives:

- Respect for existing anti-discrimination legislation
- 'Capitalising' on local actions

These objectives were affirmed on October 21 1998 when the Minister for Employment and Social Solidarity, Martine d'Aubry, announced a threefold programme:

- Better welcoming
- The fight against discrimination with a key role for trade unions, the associations, the state and public services
- Efforts to facilitate the acquisition of French nationality by non-nationals permanently resident in France.

This policy emphasis was reflected in the report produced by the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration entitled *Lutte contre les discriminations* which proposed an anti-discrimination body with strong similarities to the UK CRE. A report by a member of the Conseil d'État, Jean Michel Belorgey, also proposed an anti-discrimination body that would be similar to the CRE, although this idea seems to have lapsed. Minister d'Aubry then established a Groupe d'Etude sur les Discriminations (GED), which began its work in late 1998 (which became the Groupe d'Etudes et de Lutte Contre les Discriminations (GELD in autumn 2000) with the task of diffusing knowledge and good practice. This is a difficult task given the decentralised character of French policies concerning immigrant integration. There was also continued emphasis on both access to citizenship and the utilisation of citizenship rights. For instance, the *Assises de la Citoyenneté* in March 2000 were attended by over 1000 young people from the banlieues and Prime Minister Jospin with citizenship, housing and employment to the fore in discussion. There were, though, few concrete outcomes, although a freephone number (114) was established to report discrimination with cases referred to the Commission for Access to Citizenship (CODAC, established in February 1999). Tables 11 and 12 show perceptions of racism in France to have remained fairly constant through the 1990s and also that the main perceived targets of racism are people from the Maghreb.

France has also adopted the EU Directives of June 2000 based on Article 13 of the Amsterdam treaty dealing with direct and indirect discrimination on grounds including race, ethnicity and religion. The transposition of this legislation into French law in October 2000 means that the burden of proof in anti-discrimination cases is shared by the employer and employee, while the domain of anti-discrimination legislation was extended to cover professional training, remuneration and promotion. Three new motives for discrimination were also added to the list: physical appearance, last name and sexual orientation. It has been argued that this has created an opening for political discourse that refers to 'ethnic minorities', but this would appear to rest on an understanding of debates in France moving in an Anglo-Dutch direction. This over-states the level of convergence. It would be fair to say that there have been significant changes if hard-line republican rhetoric is taken as the benchmark for analysis. But local level policies have been far more open to immigration-related diversity and far more willing in some places to make reference to ethnic origin when developing policy responses and seeking to make the investments in human capital that are so central to discussions of immigrant integration in comparative European perspective.

**Table 12: Perceptions of the level of racism in France**

Q: Would you say that at this moment racism in France is very common, rather common, rather rare or very rare?

	02/90	10/90	11/91	11/92	11/93	11/94	11/95	11/96	11/97	11/98	11/99	10/00	Evoluti on 99/00
Very common	36	38	38	36	35	34	39	41	35	32	30	29	-1
Rather common	54	56	52	53	55	55	54	53	56	60	62	62	=
Rather rare	7	5	7	9	7	8	6	4	6	6	6	7	+1
Very rare	1	-	2	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	=
No opinion	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	+
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	

Source: Commisison Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme (2001)

**Table 13: Perceptions of the principal victims of racism and xenophobia in France**

Q: In your opinion who are the principal victims of racism, xenophobia and discrimination in France?

	02/90	10/90	11/91	11/92	11/93	11/94	11/95	11/96	11/97	11/98	11/99	10/00	Evolutio n 99/00
Maghrebis	83	85	83	83	79	77	77	83	75	76	77	75	-2
Beurs	58	59	57	65	61	67	67	71	63	65	57	55	-2
Black Africans	38	35	37	38	37	35	33	43	42	41	41	44	+3
Travelling people	37	31	24	29	33	30	28	36	37	38	28	41	+13
Jews	18	24	20	23	19	16	16	16	19	20	14	19	+5
'Native' French	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	13	7	10	+3
Antilleans	11	7	7	6	8	6	7	8	7	8	7	10	+3
Mediterranean people*	8	6	4	5	5	4	4	4	5	5	5	8	+3
East Europeans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	12	12	6	7	+1
Asians	9	7	7	7	6	8	5	6	5	7	6	6	=
Others	3	5	4	6	7	5	8	4	2	1	1	1	=
No opinion	5	3	3	3	4	6	5	3	3	3	3	3	=

\* Greek, Spanish, Italian and Portugese

Source: Commisison Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme (2001)

## **5. Southern Europe**

There are important differences between 'older' north west European countries and 'new' southern European immigration countries. In relation to the discussion of socio-economic integration that is the main focus of this report, there are important differences between the labour market organisation and welfare state type. This makes comparison difficult because of the stage of the policy process that southern European countries are in and also the social and economic processes associated with immigrant incorporation. Moreover, rather than learning from the experiences of north-west European countries, it seems more likely that southern European countries will look to policies adopted in older immigration countries. The EU can play a key role in this respect as both a forum for discussion of policy ideas and a potential mechanisms for the diffusion of good practice.

Some data from Italy and Spain illustrate these general points. First, there are higher levels of illegal/undocumented immigration in southern European countries. This reflects both push factors from neighbouring states and pull factors from sectors such as agriculture, tourism, construction and domestic service. There has been frequent regularisations in Spain and Italy, which gives us some idea of the numbers of illegal/undocumented immigrants.

**Table 14: Unauthorised immigrants and country of origin for those using regularisation schemes in Spain and Italy ('000s, 1985-1998/9)**

Italy							
1986-7		1990		1995-6		1998-9	
Morocco	21.7	Morocco	49.9	Morocco	36.2	Albania	35.0
Sri Lanka	10.7	Tunisia	25.5	Albania	32.2	Romania	20.9
Philippines	10.7	Senegal	17.0	Philippines	28.1	Morocco	20.0
Tunisia	10.0	Ex-Yugoslavia	11.3	Peru	14.0	China	17.0
Senegal	8.4	Philippines	8.7	China	13.6	Nigeria	10.2
Ex-Yugoslavia	7.1	China	8.3	Romania	9.3	Senegal	9.5
Other	50.1	Other	97.1	Other	104.8	Other	80.6
Total	118.7	Total	217.7	Total	238.2	Total	193.2

Spain					
1985-6		1991		1996	
Morocco	7.9	Morocco	48.2	Morocco	7.0
Portugal	3.8	Argentina	7.4	Peru	1.9
Senegal	3.6	Peru	5.7	China	1.4
Argentina	2.9	Dominican Rep.	5.5	Argentina	1.3
Great Britain	2.6	China	4.2	Poland	1.1
Philippines	1.9	Poland	3.9	Dominican Rep.	0.8
Other	21.1	Other	33.4	Other	7.8
Total	43.8	Total	108.3	Total	21.3

Source: Reyneri, 2001.

The relative size of the immigrant population remains relatively low (Table 14) compared to north west European countries, although residential concentration in urban areas is a common feature.

**Table 15: Authorised and unauthorised migrants in Spain and Italy (1984-98).**

Country	Year	Authorised migrants (000)	% migrants of local population	Unauthorised migrants (000)	% of population	of
Italy	1984	404	0.7	190	0.3	Total foreign population including expired permits, which amount to 10-20% of all permits.
	1988	645	1.1	212	0.4	
	1990*	780	1.4	236	0.4	
	1994*	922	1.6	272	0.5	
	1998*	1240	2.2	250	0.5	
Spain	1990	484	1.2	200	0.5	Total foreign population (nearly 30% of authorised foreigners are EU retirees)
	1995	532	1.4	150	0.4	

Source: Reyneri, 2001: 4

There is also evidence that migrant inclusion into the labour market occurs to a far greater extent in the informal sector in southern European countries than in north-west European countries. Table 15 shows the estimated underground economy as a percentage of GNP for the UK, Netherlands, France, Germany, Spain and Italy. Table 16 provides evidence from the 1996 and 1998-99 regularisations of the main areas of employment of migrant workers.

**Table 16: Estimated underground economy as a percentage of GNP**

	Average estimates		Range of estimates
UK	6.8	13.0	7-13
Germany	8.7	15.0	4-14
Netherlands	9.6	13.6	5-14
France	11.4	14.6	4-14
Spain	11.1	23.1	10-23
Italy	17.4	27.3	20-26

Source: Reyneri: 2001, p.22.

**Table 16: Breakdown by economic sector in Italy, Lombardy and Milan of migrant workers using the 1996 and 1998-99 regularisations (%)**

Sector	1996			1996	1998-99
	Italy	Lombardy		Milan	
Agriculture	13.8	3.1	Agriculture	0.8	0.9
Industry	21.3	20.8	Industry	17.6	31.6
			-building	8.5	20.8
			-metalworking	3.6	5.4
			-garment	3.1	2.8
			-other	2.4	2.6
Housekeeping	40.0	43.4	Housekeeping	48.1	28.5
Hotel and catering	7.3	6.7	Hotel and catering	6.7	7.4
Other services	17.6	25.9	Other services	26.8	31.6
			-retail trade	7.2	6.5
			-cleaning and transport	15.7	23.7
			-other	3.9	1.4
Total	100	100		100	100

Source: Reyneri, 2001: 29.

## **6. Summary and conclusions**

In this report I have attempted to outline policy developments relating to the socio-economic integration of immigrants in the Netherlands, Germany and France, with reference also to developments in southern Europe. I have shown that:

- There are similarities between 'older' north west-European countries in that they face similar issues such as levels of educational attainment, the urban focus of policy, employment and the building of social networks linked to the labour market, diversity within and between ethnic minority groups, and the arrival of new minorities associated with asylum-seeking and refugees. These countries have also experienced similar pressures arising from changed welfare state ideologies, privatisation, the impact of globalisation, and the effects of European integration. These effects are uneven across countries, but do impact upon labour and social institutions that are central to the socio-economic integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities.
- There are also elements of diversity between European countries linked to their framing of immigration issues and their distinct forms of social, political and economic organisation, particularly welfare and labour market policies. This means that policies cannot be easily transferred because what works and the reasons why it work might be nationally specific (it might also be an unintended rather than an intended effect. Thus point is illustrated by the role of works council and the apprenticeship system in Germany.
- This highlights a distinction between policies and non-policies in the sense that countries such as Germany without specific immigrant integration policies have managed to integrate foreigners as workers, albeit not as citizens. It could even be argued that this occurred at a higher level than in the ostensibly more inclusive Netherlands. I identified the role of works' councils and the apprenticeship system as particularly important. This illustrates that immigrant integration cannot be detached from more general labour and social policies
- There has been a move away from multicultural policies which were seen as leading to marginalisation and towards an emphasis on integration with language, education and employment as key elements of 'settling down' policies for new immigrants. This has certainly the case for the Netherlands (also for Sweden too). This reflects both changes in

welfare state ideologies and communitarian ideas, but because these are relatively new policies there is little evidence of their effectiveness.

- National policy models must be placed in some kind of multi-level context. By this I mean that the sub-national level is a vital arena for the implementation of policy, the investment in human capital and the building of social networks linked to the labour market.
- The EU's role has grown in areas such as labour market policy, social policy, migration policy and anti-discrimination. This does not mean the development of a 'European model' in these areas. These powers do, though, seem likely to continue to develop, although their impact will be uneven across member states. The UK has been relatively successful in the sense that prevalent ideas about direct and indirect discrimination have become the mainstay of the new EU anti-discrimination directives. This suggests that the EU can be a forum for the pursuit of what from a UK perspective would be seen as good practice.